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Even risky pension sponsors could oﬀer essentially riskless pension promises
by contributing a suﬃcient level of resources to their pension trust funds and
by investing those resources in ﬁxed-income securities designed to deliver their
payoﬀs just as pension obligations are coming due. However, almost no ﬁrm has
chosen to fund its plan in this manner. We study the optimal funding choice
for plan sponsors by developing a simple model of pension ﬁnancing in which
the total compensation oﬀered to workers must clear the labor market. We ﬁnd
that if workers understand the implications of pension risk, they will demand
greater compensation for riskier pension promises than for safer ones, all else
equal. Indeed, in our model, pension sponsors maximize their value by making
their pension promises free of risk. We close by positing some explanations for
why no real-world ﬁrm follows the prescription of our model.
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11 Introduction
In the aggregate, private deﬁned-beneﬁt pension plans in the United States are un-
derfunded by a considerable margin. The Pension Beneﬁt Guaranty Corporation, the
federal insurer of such plans, puts the aggregate shortfall of assets from liabilities
among insured single-employer plans at about $350 billion as of September 30, 2006
(PBGC 2006, p. 8). In addition, the characteristics of the assets that these plans
hold are very diﬀerent from the characteristics of their liabilities. Coronado and Liang
(2006) ﬁnd that the typical pension trust holds 60 percent to 70 percent of its value
in equities. In contrast, by at least one deﬁnition, liability is ﬁxed and known with
certainty in nominal terms.1 These two factors—the substantial shortfall of assets
from liabilities and the mismatch between assets and liabilities—imply that private
DB plans are a risky proposition for both workers and ﬁrms.2
As Bodie (1990) and others have pointed out, even risky ﬁrms could greatly reduce
the risk of their pension promises by contributing a suﬃcient level of resources to
their pension trust funds and by investing those resources in ﬁxed-income securities
designed to deliver their payoﬀs just as pension obligations are coming due. This
strategy would immunize the pension fund from market ﬂuctuations, because stock
returns would be irrelevant and interest-rate changes would aﬀect pension assets
(through bond values) and liabilities (through the present value of future obligations)
at the same time and by the same amounts.3 Despite this possibility, almost all
1The deﬁnition of liability that we have in mind here is known as the Accumulated Beneﬁt
Obligation, or ABO.
2Another key ingredient in the mix is the fact that the PBGC insurance is subject to certain
limitations; as a result, workers bear some risk even with the Federal backstop. See PBGC (2000)
for a helpful description and analysis of these beneﬁt limitations.
3As a practical matter, ﬁrms could not literally eliminate the risk in their pension promises
because those promises extend 50 years or more into the future—much further than the current
reach of ﬁxed-income markets with reasonable liquidity. Even so, it seems clear that ﬁrms could
come much closer to immunizing their liabilities if they wanted to.
2ﬁrms choose to make their pension promises risky.4 Thus the question motivating
this paper: Is it optimal for ﬁrms to introduce more than the minimum amount of
risk into their pension promises? In particular, can ﬁrms really gain value by making
their pension promises risky rather than free of risk? In this paper, we develop a
model of pension ﬁnancing in which the total compensation oﬀered to workers must
clear the labor market, an approach that formalizes some of the ideas suggested by
Bulow (1982) and Bodie (1988, 1990, inter alia). The ﬁrms in our model maximize
their value by making their pension promises free of risk.
Many readers will ﬁnd this conclusion to be highly counterintuitive. How could a
ﬁrm improve its ﬁnancial position by oﬀering a riskless pension promise rather than
a risky one? Aren’t risky promises discounted at higher rates of return than riskless
ones, ensuring that the present-discounted value (PDV) of a riskless promise exceeds
the PDV of a risky one? By making the pension promise riskless, won’t ﬁrms therefore
be taking on additional cost?
The answer is yes, ﬁrms that eliminate the risk from previously risky pension
promises will take on additional pension cost. But minimizing pension cost alone is
not the appropriate objective for ﬁrms to pursue: Firms should aim to minimize the
market value of total compensation cost, not pension cost in isolation (holding the real
activity of the ﬁrm constant). We show that if workers understand the implications
of pension risk, they will demand greater compensation for riskier pension promises
than for safer ones, all else being equal. Thus while riskier pension promises may
reduce pension cost, they do not reduce the total compensation cost of the ﬁrms in
4We are aware of only one ﬁrm in the United States having ever made its pension promises close
to risk-free: According to Walsh (2005), United Airlines invested its pension trust entirely in ﬁxed-
income securities designed to immunize its pension obligations until a change in policy occurred in
1987. In England, Boots Pharmaceutical also reportedly held its pension trust entirely in ﬁxed-
income securities from 2001 to 2004 (Ralfe, 2004), but has since partially backed away from that
position.
3our model.
One way to see the economic intuition for this result is to think of workers as
disadvantaged bondholders of the ﬁrm—“bondholders” because they hold promises
of future payments just as ordinary bondholders do, but “disadvantaged” because,
unlike ordinary bondholders, workers are assumed to be unable to diversify away the
company-speciﬁc risk to which they are exposed through risky pension promises. In
return for the promise of a risky DB pension, workers oﬀer their employers a lower
“pric” (in the form of wage concessions) than the employers could obtain from bond-
market investors in return for the same promised cash ﬂows. Thus, we generate a
violation of the standard Modigliani-Miller result that purely ﬁnancial operations do
not aﬀect the value of the ﬁrm: Firms that oﬀer a risky pension plan are committing
a form of ﬁnancial ineﬃciency because they are obtaining part of their ﬁnancing on
worse-than-market terms. The more they avail themselves of this source of ﬁnancing,
the more they reduce their own value. Taking the risk out of the pension promise
eliminates the ﬁnancial ineﬃciency because in that case—and that case only—workers
are willing to provide ﬁnancing on terms that are as good as the ones that the ﬁrm
could obtain from ﬁnancial markets.
This paper is only a ﬁrst step because, for the sake of transparency and simplicity,
we focus explicitly on a single source of pension risk—the employer’s funding (i.e.,
contribution) decision, abstracting from the portfolio allocation decision. In addi-
tion, we suppress a number of important features of the pension landscape, some
of which would reinforce the argument in favor of making the pension promise risk-
less, and some of which would weaken it. One of these factors is the PBGC, which
oﬀers insurance against downside risk, and—in return—charges premiums far be-
low the economically fair level. Another factor that we suppress is the tax code,
and its associated inﬂuence on portfolio allocation. A third factor is the empirical
4regularity—noted by Bodie (1990), that workers seem to hold a call option on part
of the surplus in pension trust funds. The way for ﬁrms to minimize the market
value of this call option is to eliminate the upside potential associated with the trust
fund; this, in turn is accomplished by matching the characteristics of the assets in the
trust fund to the characteristics of the plan’s liabilities. So again, this consideration
strengthens the argument for making the pension promise free of risk. In work in
progress, we are extending the model to include the portfolio allocation decision, and
to capture some of the additional factors omitted here.
Our paper proceeds as follows: In the next section, we brieﬂy review the literature
that has considered whether ﬁrms should oﬀer a risky pension promise or one that
is free of risk. Then we present a bare-bones model with a consumer that lives for
two periods, earning cash wages when young and a pension when old. We ﬁnd that,
in this model, the ﬁrm’s optimal strategy is to fund the pension promise fully. We
also begin the process of exploring the robustness of this result to variations in model
speciﬁcation and calibration. We close by revisiting the question of why no real-world
ﬁrm follows the prescription of our model.
2 Related literature
Early work on pension funding recognized that pension obligations represent con-
tingent liabilities for shareholders and contingent assets for employees, where the
contingency is the solvency of the ﬁrm. Sharpe (1976), Black (1976), and Treynor
(1977) demonstrate that this structure implies that a ﬁrm’s pension obligation can
be analyzed in an options-pricing framework: Firms eﬀectively own an option that
entitles them to put the funding gap to their employees if and when the ﬁrms become
5insolvent.5 The value of the pension obligation in an economic balance sheet therefore
consists of promised beneﬁts (a liability) and a put option on the diﬀerence between
promised beneﬁts and the value of the trust fund (an asset).
Using standard options theory, Treynor shows that increasing the risk of the un-
derlying assets increases the value of the put option and therefore—holding other
forms of compensation constant—the value of shareholder equity. As a result, again
ignoring any changes in other components of compensation, the put option provides
an explanation for why corporations might prefer that pension fund managers invest
in risky assets. Sharpe (1976) demonstrates that if workers have access to perfect
capital markets and if there is no ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk, workers can oﬀset the pension
funding decisions of the ﬁrm so long as the ﬁrm is guaranteed to survive. In this case,
the funding decision is irrelevant: A ﬁrm can either fully fund its pension, or it can
underfund it and pay employees an additional amount equal to the put value of the
shortfall.
Harrison and Sharpe (1983) analyze pension asset allocation and funding decisions
in the presence of potentially mispriced pension insurance. Following Tepper (1981),
they allow tax considerations to aﬀect the investment of pension assets. Abstract-
ing from mispriced pension insurance, they conﬁrm Tepper’s result that ﬁrms will
optimally invest pension assets (which are tax-exempt) entirely in the higher-taxed
assets (bonds). They demonstrate, however, that presence of mispriced pension in-
surance can overturn this result. In particular, if equities are a more eﬀective vehicle
for taking advantage of na¨ ıve insurance pricing, the optimal pension strategy may
5This framework ignores the PBGC, which covers unfunded beneﬁts in the event of bankruptcy.
In a framework that includes the PBGC, the ﬁrm can put its unfunded obligations to the PBGC
(rather than to employees). However, the value of the put option to the PBGC is reduced by the
premiums that ﬁrms must pay to the PBGC while the plan is healthy. If the premiums are fairly
priced, the value of the put is reduced to zero; while if the insurance is under-priced, the put option
retains some value.
6involve a combination of equities and debt. A common feature of these studies is that
they tend to focus almost exclusively on the decisions of ﬁrms without reference to
the economic decisions of employees. For example, Treynor ignores the labor-market
response to the eﬀect of the put option on the value of compensation, and Sharpe
does not consider the eﬀect of undiversiﬁable ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk on employee compen-
sation demands. Bulow (1982) brings the idea of market-clearing compensation into
the model: in his words, “[a]t each point in time, the ﬁrm should be willing to pay
its employees their marginal product, in the form of a combination of salary and ben-
eﬁts.” Implicit in this condition is that risk transfers between ﬁrms and employees
must be compensated—an insight that is central to our argument.
A few recent studies have moved beyond the eﬀect of pension investments on
the value of the put option and examined other factors aﬀecting pension funding
and investments. As noted earlier, Bodie (1990) argues that employees may have an
implicit call option on a portion of the returns in the trust fund if they can bargain
for higher salary or more-generous pensions in high-return states of the world. If this
is the case, the pension allocation decision is tilted toward assets that more nearly
mimic the characteristics of liabilities because the ﬁrm is obligated to make up for
any shortfall as long as it remains solvent but is also pressured into distributing a
portion of upside realizations to workers in the form of higher compensation.6
Rauh (2006) focuses on what he calls the ﬁrm’s risk-management incentive: If
a ﬁrm survives, it must make up any shortfall between the trust fund and promised
beneﬁts. As a result, pension investment decisions aﬀect liquidity and cash ﬂow as well
as the value of its put option. If these eﬀects are strong enough, they can outweigh the
6Just as employees must receive additional compensation to remain indiﬀerent to larger values of
the ﬁrm’s pension put, they presumably value the call option on the trust fund surplus. If employees
were risk neutral, they would value the increased call just enough to accept lower compensation that
would leave the ﬁrm in a ﬁnancial position that is neither better nor worse. But if utility is concave,
workers will presumably value the call option by less than the market value loss to the ﬁrm.
7put-option incentive, leading ﬁrms to move away from risky pension assets. Indeed,
looking at small to medium sized ﬁrms, Rauh ﬁnds that ﬁrms with the strongest put-
option incentive to shift risks to employees—those closest to default—tend to invest
in safer assets than ﬁrms with well-funded pensions.
Another factor, identiﬁed by Lucas and Zeldes (2006), is that ﬁrms may invest
pension assets in equity as a hedge against future wage growth (and thus future
pension obligations). In this framework, equities provide a hedge against wage growth
as long as wage growth and equity returns are suﬃciently correlated. Finally, a
number of authors, including Bader (2003), Bodie (1998, 2000), Gold and Hudson
(2003), Ralfe et al. (2004), and Wilcox (2006), have recently argued that pension
funds should hold only bonds for various reasons, including immunization against
interest rate movements, reduced balance-sheet risk, improved pension security for
employees, improved tax eﬃciency and reduced administrative costs. However, none
of these papers oﬀers an explicit model of pension funding and investment in the
context of an equilibrium model of employee compensation. This paper aims to begin
ﬁlling that gap by developing a model of pension funding.7
3 The model
The representative worker in our model lives for two periods. The worker consumes
in both periods, and supplies one unit of labor when young. Compensation comes in
two forms: wages, denoted by w, received when the worker is young, and beneﬁts,
denoted by ˜ b, received when the worker is old.8 The budget constraint is given by:
c2 = (1 + r)(w − c1) +˜ b
7Future work will extend the model to include the investment decision.
8Throughout, tildes denote variables that are random from the perspective of the ﬁrst period.
8where c1 and c2 are ﬁrst- and second-period consumption, respectively, and r is a
risk-free rate.
The ﬁrm that employs the representative worker is at risk of declaring bankruptcy
at the end of the ﬁrst period; let π be the probability that bankruptcy occurs. In gen-
eral, the probability of bankruptcy is correlated with the state of the macroeconomy
and hence with the performance of the risky asset; when times are good and the risky
asset enjoys a high return, the probability of bankruptcy presumably is relatively
low, on average. To simplify the model, however, we assume that the probability of
bankruptcy of the ﬁrm we study is uncorrelated with the state of the economy.9
The level of beneﬁts actually received, ˜ b, depends on the level of beneﬁts promised,
b∗; the amount that the ﬁrm contributes into the trust fund in the ﬁrst period, d;
and the stochastic characteristics of bankruptcy. If the ﬁrm survives into the second
period, the worker receives the full amount of promised beneﬁts. From the worker’s
perspective, this implies:
˜ b = b
∗;
From the ﬁrm’s perspective, it implies that if the ﬁrm survives and the value of
the trust fund falls short of b∗, the ﬁrm must contribute enough to make up for
the shortfall in the trust fund. On the other hand, if the value of the trust fund
exceeds b∗, the surplus reverts to shareholders.10 Thus, assuming the ﬁrm survives,
its compensation costs will consist of w + d paid in the ﬁrst period plus
max{b
∗ − (1 + r)d, 0} − max{(1 + r)d − b
∗, 0}
paid in the second period.
9We believe that the central result in this paper is not sensitive to this simpliﬁcation.
10Literally speaking, the surplus value could remain in the trust fund for a time, and be recouped
by shareholders over time in the form of reduced contributions into the trust fund.
9On the other hand, if the ﬁrm declares bankruptcy at the end of the ﬁrst period,
the worker receives whichever is the lesser of the promised beneﬁt and the proceeds
of the trust fund:
˜ b = min[b
∗, (1 + r)d]
In this case, the ﬁrm’s compensation costs are still reduced by any surplus in the
trust fund over promised beneﬁts; but a consequence of declaring bankruptcy is that
the ﬁrm escapes responsibility for making up any shortfall in trust-fund assets. Thus,
when the ﬁrm goes bankrupt in the second period, its total compensation costs consist
of w + d paid in the ﬁrst period minus
max{(1 + r)d − b
∗, 0}
paid in the second period.
Note that even though, in this simpliﬁed version of the model, the ﬁrm is compelled
to invest the trust fund entirely in the risk-free asset, the pension beneﬁt is certain only
if the ﬁrm contributes enough to the pension trust in the ﬁrst period to fully prefund
the pension liability at the risk-free rate (d ≥ b∗/(1+r)). If the ﬁrm contributes less
than enough to fund the promised pension beneﬁt at the risk-free rate, the beneﬁt
is at risk because the ﬁrm might declare bankruptcy and therefore fail to top up the
pension trust in the second period.








where δ is the subjective rate of discount.
The worker chooses c1 and c2 to maximize expected utility. The ﬁrst-order condi-









A critical assumption is that the labor market is perfectly competitive and that work-
ers fully understand the implications of the risk embedded in the promised pension
beneﬁt for their expected utility. As a result of that understanding, ﬁrms are un-
able to employ any workers unless the compensation package they oﬀer provides the
market-clearing level of expected utility.
The ﬁrm minimizes the market value of compensation. The ﬁrm’s choice variables
are the wage paid in the ﬁrst period, the promised beneﬁt paid in the second period,
and the contribution into the trust fund in the ﬁrst period.
min
w, b∗, d
w + d − PDV (max{(1 + r)d − b∗, 0}|survival)
+PDV (max{b∗ − (1 + r)d, 0}|survival)
−PDV (max{(1 + r)d − b∗, 0}|bankruptcy)
(3)
The expression can be simpliﬁed by noting that the trust-fund surplus, if any, reverts
to the plan sponsor regardless of whether the ﬁrm declares bankruptcy. Thus, the
cost minimization problem can be stated as:
min
w, b∗, d
w + d − PDV (max{(1 + r)d − b∗, 0})
+PDV (max{b∗ − (1 + r)d, 0}|survival)
(4)
Because the cash ﬂow associated with the ﬁrst maximum term is known with
certainty once the ﬁrm chooses b∗ and d, it can be discounted at the risk-free rate,
11and the term can be simpliﬁed as follows:






1+r if d − b∗
1+r ≥ 0
0 if d − b∗
1+r < 0
The valuation of the second maximum term is more complicated because it is a claim
that is exercised only when the ﬁrm survives into the second period; that is, it does
not have the usual structure of a put option. Nonetheless, we can value it using a













if d − b∗
1+r < 0
(5)







1+r if d − b∗
1+r ≥ 0





if d − b∗
1+r < 0
(6)
Note that the direct incentive to the ﬁrm, ignoring any adjustment in the compensa-
tion demands of the worker, is to minimize the prefunding of the pension obligation
by setting d as low as possible. We shall see, however, that the response from the
worker is so strong as to overwhelm these direct eﬀects.
The ﬁrm conducts this cost minimization subject to the constraint that the com-
pensation it pays must provide the market-clearing level of utility.12 The ﬁrm also
11For an example of a similar application of this method, see Pennacchi (2006), pages 16 and
following.
12This is a labor-market equilibrium constraint. One way to think about this is to imagine that
workers compare the utility of risky compensation oﬀers to a reference level of utility from a risk-free
compensation package. Thus, a risk-averse worker would prefer a risk-free compensation package to
a risky one that provides the same expected value.
12assumes that the worker arranges consumption in the optimal manner between the
ﬁrst and second period, and that the budget constraint is binding. For convenience,


















c2 = (1 + r)(w − c1) +˜ b
4 Results
We ﬁnd that the ﬁrm minimizes its total compensation cost by contributing at least
the full amount of the promised beneﬁt in the ﬁrst period, d ≥ b∗/(1 + r). In this




We demonstrate this result both numerically and analytically. To show the result
numerically, we implement and solve a simple numerical model. In this model, utility
exhibits exhibit constant relative risk aversion and the subjective rate of discount is
assumed to be equal to the interest rate. To solve the model, we ﬁrst compute the
level of utility associated with an initial set of compensation parameters w, d, and
13b∗ and then search for the combination of w and d that minimizes costs for a given
pension obligation b∗ and subject to the constraint that utility equals u. We solve the
model for both plausible and extreme speciﬁcations of risk aversion and the risk-free
return,13 and with the exception of linear utility, all of our speciﬁcations produce the
same result: The ﬁrm optimally selects d ≥ b∗/(1 + r).
We can also demonstrate the result analytically. If the ﬁrm makes the pension
beneﬁt risky, the worker will receive (in present-value terms) b∗/(1 + r) with prob-
ability 1 − π and d with probability π. Of course, this is an inferior oﬀer from the
worker’s perspective relative to receiving b∗/(1 + r) with certainty, and the worker
will demand to be compensated for that loss. Does any level of compensation exist
that both (a) the ﬁrm would be willing to pay in return for being allowed to make
the pension promise risky, and (b) the worker would see as suﬃciently generous as to
rationalize accepting a risky promise rather than a risk-free one? At most, the ﬁrm
would be willing to pay π(b∗/(1 + r) − d) because that is the market value of the
direct ﬁnancial beneﬁt to the ﬁrm from making the beneﬁt risky rather than risk-free
(as can be seen from equation (6)). To see whether the ﬁrm could ever get workers
to accept a risky beneﬁt, consider the extreme case in which the ﬁrm transfers all
of that value back to workers with certainty, in return for being allowed to make
the pension promise risky. In that case, the payments to the worker would have the
following structure: π (b∗/(1 + r) − d) with certainty, plus b∗/(1 + r) when the ﬁrm
does not declare bankruptcy—that is, in 100(1 − π percent of the outcomes in the
second period, and d in the other 100π percent of the outcomes. From the perspective
of the worker, the deﬁciency of this even this oﬀer—the most generous one the ﬁrm
would be willing to make—is clear: Even with the greatest compensation the ﬁrm
13We solved the model for CRRA coeﬃcients between 0 and 30, and for risk-free returns between
0 and 300 percent.
14would be willing to make, the expected value of the payment to the worker is only
b∗/(1+r) ; but the payment under this risky approach has positive variance, a char-
acteristic that makes the proposition strictly inferior to receiving b∗/(1 + r) for sure.
In other words, the ﬁrm is oﬀering the worker a lottery that has an expected value of
zero. A straightforward application of Jensen’s inequality demonstrates that as long
as utility is strictly concave, this lottery must decrease utility.14 To make the worker
indiﬀerent between this lottery and a fully funded pension with d = b∗/(1 + r), the
ﬁrm would therefore have to increase compensation by more than π (b∗/(1 + r) − d),
the value of the cost reduction. We conclude that the ﬁrm cannot reduce total costs
by underfunding its pension.
The analytical and numerical results follow inevitably from the curvature of the
utility function and from the fact that the worker is unable to diversify away the
idiosyncratic risks associated with bankruptcy. The concavity of utility implies that
workers are risk averse, and the inability to diversify away the idiosyncratic risk
means that the worker will demand a wage premium in excess of what would be
required by participants in the bond market who can, by hypothesis, diversify away
all idiosyncratic risk. Thus, the most eﬃcient funding strategy for the ﬁrm must be
to contribute the full present discounted value of promised beneﬁts.
5 Interpretation
Our model provides a clear result that ﬁrms minimize their costs when they fully fund
their pension promise (and preliminary work underway suggests an equally clear result
14If u0(.) is convex, which corresponds to Kimball’s (1990) notion of “prudence,” then Jensen’s
inequality implies that a mean-preserving spread of pension beneﬁts must increase the right-hand
side of the consumer’s Euler condition, given by equation (2). First-period consumption must fall
to rebalance the equation, with the result that the marginal utility of consumption will be higher in
both periods relative to the case of a certain pension beneﬁt. Since utility in each period is strictly
increasing, expected lifetime utility must be lower in the presence of the lottery.
15that the cost-minimizing investment strategy is an all-bond portfolio). While these
results may be consistent with some of the prior literature, they are unquestionably
at odds with the current practice of private DB funds. This gap raises the question
of what elements of reality are missing from our model. In this section we consider a
few of the leading possibilities.
The frictions we examine can be summarized by a simple taxonomy: one or more
of the key players in the model (employees, employers, shareholders, or taxpayers)
face informational or other barriers that prevent the equilibrium result from obtaining.
We examine these possibilities one at a time.
Employees. A key assumption of our model is that employees fully understand
and value the eﬀects of the risk characteristics of the pension plan on their own utility.
If informational costs or other frictions prevent workers from demanding additional
compensation when the risk of their DB promise goes up, then our result will not
hold. Prior to the recent spate of DB terminations and freezes, plan failures were
quite rare, so it is plausible that many workers were not accustomed to thinking of a
pension promise as a risky asset.15
An additional possibility is that employees understand but do not value the pen-
sion risk in the way that we model. For example, perhaps workers are indiﬀerent
toward a risky pension promise because they are also shareholders and they feel that
whatever is good for the company is good for them (despite the undiversiﬁable risk
they face from the ﬁrm’s fortunes).16
Employers. Even if employees understand and value the risk they face from
15When plan failures did occur, they were mostly in large industrial sectors such as steel and
airlines, in which labor markets were dominated by union negotiations. In this context, negotiations
sometimes involved the workers’ accepting current wage concessions in exchange for (clearly risky)
future pension increases—an environment in which workers in struggling industries were essentially
forced by structural forces in the economy to accept lower total compensation.
16This situation would be somewhat analogous to 401(k) participants who hold large shares of
their retirement accounts in company stock, against the advice of most ﬁnancial advisors.
16their pension promise, the mechanism may break down if employers face institutional
rigidities or other considerations in managing their pension funds. For example, debt
instruments do not go out as many years into the future as pension liabilities do,
making it impossible to literally immunize all pension liabilities. These rigidities
may prevent ﬁrms from oﬀering risk-free pension promises even when it is in their
long-term interest to do so.17 Over time, ﬁrms might oﬀer more debt at very long
maturities if they perceived the market as demanding it.
Shareholders. Another key assumption in the model is that ﬁrms are mini-
mizing costs in order to maximize shareholder value. If informational costs prevent
shareholders from properly assessing the risk of the pension promise (and hence the
total economic costs facing the ﬁrm), then again the mechanism cam break down
and the result may not hold. The most likely margin for this scenario to take place
in reality is related to the arcane and diﬃcult set of accounting rules that apply to
pension obligations. As we noted in the introduction, current accounting rules allow
ﬁrms to book expected pension fund earnings as income, while smoothing any discrep-
ancy between expected and actual earnings over ﬁve years. This treatment eﬀectively
allows ﬁrms to book the equity premium as an asset while displaying only a fraction
of the associated variance in its reported earnings, providing an incentive to invest the
pension fund signiﬁcantly in risky assets. While market values of pension assets and
liabilities are reported in footnotes, Coronado and Sharpe (2003) show that investors
appear to be fooled by the balance sheet and income statements and to factor in only
a portion of the detail provided in the footnotes. The Financial Accounting Standards
Board is currently undertaking a long-term project to revisit pension accounting, so
this informational friction may be reduced in the relatively near future.
17Indeed the lack of long-dated ﬁxed-income securities was a key reason cited by Boots for its
retreat from an all-bond portfolio in 2004.
17Taxpayers. Finally, an additional breakdown of the model can occur through
the last key economic player, which is the taxpayer. Our current model provides no
role for taxpayers because there is no pension insurance. Our result would disappear
if employees were fully insured against the loss of beneﬁts in the event of bankruptcy,
because in that case, worker compensation would not depend on the ﬁrm’s pension
funding policy and the ﬁrm would be either indiﬀerent over funding strategies (if
PBGC premiums were economically fair) or would strictly prefer a risky funding
strategy (if PBGC premiums were less than economically fair). In reality, the PBGC
does not fully insure pension beneﬁts (giving workers an incentive to monitor funding
strategies), but their premiums are not fairly priced, both because they are too low
in general (CBO, 2005), and because they do not depend on the risk of the pension
promise.18 In principle, the mispricing could be severe enough to cause the ﬁrm
in our model to prefer a risky pension promise—despite the surcharge assessed by
workers—because some of the risk is shared with taxpayers.
6 Conclusion
It has long been recognized that underfunded pensions allow ﬁrms to shed cost in
times of bankruptcy. At ﬁrst blush, this form of implicit insurance seems to raise
the possibility of moral hazard, with ﬁrms maximizing pension risk at the employees’
expense. In the model we present here, the ﬁrm’s optimal pension funding strategy is
not to shift pension risk to employees, but rather to structure the pension fund so that
it will deliver promised beneﬁts in all states of the world. Our argument relies entirely
on the principle that workers will demand to receive suﬃcient total compensation to
18The premium can increase with underfunding, but does not vary according to the ﬁnancial
health of the ﬁrm or the extent to which the assets of the trust fund have been invested to immunize
the risk of the liabilities.
18allow them to achieve a market-clearing level of utility. In our model, risk-averse
workers faced with a risky pension will bargain for a wage increase that ends up
costing the ﬁrm more than the reduction in the market value of pension costs due to
underfunding.
In work underway, we are extending our model to generalize the asset-pricing
assumptions we use here, incorporate a portfolio-allocation decision by the pension
fund, and allow additional richness such as mispriced PBGC insurance. In addi-
tion, we seek to explore conditions under which risky pensions could be part of an
equilibrium compensation package.
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21Appendix
The value of the pension put can be calculated using standard binomial methods.
To price the option, it turns out to be helpful to distinguish between two regimes:
one where the ﬁrm contributes an amount to the pension fund suﬃcient to guarantee
promised beneﬁts in all states, and one where the pension fund will always fall short
of promised beneﬁts if the ﬁrm goes bankrupt. In the ﬁrst case, the value of the
pension put is simply 0 since the contingent liability does not alter the ﬁrm’s costs.





The second regime, where b∗−(1+r)d > 0, is more interesting. In this case, the ﬁrm
only makes up for the pension shortfall when it is solvent. The ﬁrm’s obligation is
b∗ − (1 + r)d > 0 if the ﬁrm is solvent
0 if the ﬁrm goes bankrupt
To keep things simple, we assume that the ﬁrm has debt outstanding with return





d. Given two payoﬀs (given above) and two assets (own-ﬁrm debt and the
risk-free asset), we can solve for the replicating portfolio that generates the payoﬀs
in all states of nature. The portfolio amounts ω1 and ω2 can be found by solving the
following equation.
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can be interpreted as the risk-neutral probability asso-
ciated with an “up” movement in the own-ﬁrm debt return. As a simpliﬁcation, we
assume that own-ﬁrm debt is uncorrelated with the market return and in expectation
22earns zero excess returns over the risk-free rate. According to the standard CAPM
formula,
˜ rd − r = β (˜ r − r) + εd,
where ˜ r is the market rate of return, β is the beta coeﬃcient (which is zero by
assumption), and εd is assumed to be a mean-zero error term.
We assume that own-ﬁrm debt pays rh
d if the ﬁrm remains solvent and rl
d if the
ﬁrm goes bankrupt. The mean-zero error term can therefore take on the following




d if the ﬁrm remains solvent
εl
d if the ﬁrm enters bankruptcy
Given a probability of bankruptcy of π and our assumption that εd has a mean of





































which added to w + b∗/(1 + r) yields the result in equation (5) in the text.
23